Abstract-In this paper, we aim to establish a holistic framework that integrates the cyber-physical layers of a cloud-enabled Internet of Controlled Things (IoCT) through the lens of contract theory. At the physical layer, the device uses cloud services to operate the system. The quality of cloud services is unknown to the device, and hence the device designs a menu of contracts to enable a reliable and incentive-compatible service. Based on the received contracts, the cloud service provider (SP) serves the device by determining its optimal cyber defense strategy. A contract-based FlipCloud game is used to assess the security risk and the cloud quality of service (QoS) under advanced persistent threats. The contract design approach creates a pricing mechanism for on-demand security as a service for cloud-enabled IoCT. By focusing on high and low QoS types of cloud SPs, we find that the contract design can be divided into two regimes (regimes I and II) with respect to the provided cloud QoS. Specifically, the physical devices whose optimal contracts are in regime I always request the best possible cloud security service. In contrast, the device only asks for a cloud security level that can stabilize the system when the optimal contracts lie in regime II. We illustrate the obtained results via case studies of a cloud-enabled smart home.
Security as a Service for Cloud-Enabled Internet of A cloud-enabled IoCT allows heterogeneous components to provide services in an integrated system. For example, cloud resources can provide data aggregation, storage and processing for the physical systems. Fig. 1 shows a framework of the cloud-enabled IoCT. The sensors associated with devices 1 can send data to the remote controllers through up-links, and the control commands can be sent back to the actuator via downlinks. Both directions of information transmission are enabled by the cloud layer. Specifically, the large amount of collected sensor data can be stored and aggregated in the cloud, and the controller can retrieve the data and compute the control command on the cloud. Hence, this cloud-enabled framework provides an efficient approach to remote control of physical systems. The cloud-enabled IoCT can be divided into two layers including the cyber and physical components. Generally, the devices at the physical layer and the cloud at the cyber layer belong to two different entities, e.g., the physical devices may not own the cyber infrastructure to communicate the controller or sensor information.
The cloud layer in Fig. 1 can be insecure, since it faces cyber threats, and malicious attackers can steal or infer keys used to authenticate devices in the cloud-enabled IoCT. These types of attacks are known as advanced persistent threats (APTs) [5] . The traditional cryptography approaches are not sufficient to deal with this class of attacks, since APTs lead to complete compromise of the cloud without the detection of network administrators. Some real-world examples of APTs include the Stuxnet which broke down approximately one fifth of nuclear centrifuges in Iran [6] . In addition, the operation "Red October" compromised the network systems of a large number of diplomatic, governmental and scientific research organizations to steal credential data in various countries across the world [7] . Due to the stealthiness and persistent nature of APTs, the cyber defense against APTs should shift from the focus on designing perfect security using cryptographic methods to best-effort strategic defense by optimally allocating constrained security resources. To this end, we use a contractbased FlipCloud (CB-FlipCloud) game-theoretic framework to model APTs of the cloud. In CB-FlipCloud, the attacker and the defender compete to control the cloud resources for a larger fraction of time through paying a cost. The strategic outcome of the CB-FlipCloud game determines the vulnerability of cloud layer in IoCT.
At the physical layer, the devices use optimal control to minimize the operational cost. As shown in Fig. 1 , the performance of the physical system is closely related to the security of the cloud. To use the cloud services, the device needs to plan and buy services from the cloud to fulfill its control task. Specifically, the device should provide economic incentives to the service provider (SP) at the cyber layer to secure the cloud resources. Since the quality of services (QoS) of different SPs in terms of the cloud security are not identical, we consider without loss of generality two types of cloud SPs, i.e., the high and the low QoS types. The device has no knowledge about the type of the cloud which is private information of the SP. By leveraging techniques from contract theory, we capture the service relationships between the device and cloud SP which further create a new paradigm of security as a service (SaaS) in cloud-enabled IoCT. The challenge of the contract design lies in the design of an incentive compatible and efficient mechanism for the integrated system in spite of the incomplete information.
To address the contract design problem of devices, we need to establish a holistic framework that integrates the cyberphysical layers in IoCT together. On one hand, at the cyber layer, the cloud SP designs a cyber defense strategy based on the received contract, and the resulting Nash equilibrium of CB-FlipCloud game determines the cloud QoS. On the other hand, the device at the physical layer designs an optimal controller based on the received cloud QoS. The requirement of physical performance together with the service fee paid to the cloud SP are two major factors that guide the optimal contract design of the device. The interdependencies between the cyber and physical layers make the contract design and cloud protection strategy coupled and thus should be addressed jointly. Specifically, we formulate a mechanism design problem for the device that takes into account the incentive compatibility and individual rationality of cloud SP and obtain the optimal contracts by using revelation principle [8] . We find that the contract design can be divided into two regimes (regime I and regime II) in terms of the provided cloud QoS. For the contracts in regime I, the devices always request the best possible cloud security service since these physical systems require highly reliable cloud-enabled communications to achieve a satisfying performance. On the contrary, for the devices whose optimal contracts are in regime II, they will only require the level of cloud security that can sufficiently stabilize the system. More details and insights of the obtained results are presented in Section V.
The contract design approach enables an on-demand service provision of security and a pricing mechanism to service real-time cloud-enabled IoCT. This SaaS paradigm provides reliable ways to deliver critical IT services to future IoTs. The applications of the proposed cloud-enabled IoCT framework and the adopted contract-based approach are massive, such as remote 3D printing, control of mobile robotic networks, remote surgery, networking in interdependent critical infrastructures, generation planning in smart grids [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . In this paper, we illustrate the contract design principles and results with an application to smart homes.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We use contract design principles to propose an integrative cyber-physical framework to develop a holistic incentive-compatible and cost-efficient security as a service mechanism for real-time operation of cloud-enabled IoCT under APTs. 2) We compose the FlipCloud game with the contract design through a bi-level game model to capture the strategic interactions between the service provider, the device and the adversary. 3) We characterize the solution to the optimal cyberphysical contract design in two regimes, and propose iterative algorithms to compute parameters of the contracts. 4) We apply the developed design methodologies to a cloud-enabled smart home and show that the pricing and contract mechanism enables a scalable, risk-aware and application dependent service provision for heterogeneous types of IoCTs.
A. Related Work
Cloud-enabled networked control systems (CE-NCS) are becoming popular and have been investigated in a number of fields including 3D printers [9] , robotics [11] and smart grids [15] . The security of CE-NCS is a critical concern, and it has been studied in [9] , [16] by proposing a multilayer game-theoretic framework. In addition, an even larger number of works have been focused on the security issues in NCS [17] [18] [19] [20] .
Game-theoretic methods have been extensively used to model the cyber security [20] [21] [22] . In [23] , the authors have addressed the resource allocation in defending against stealthy attacks through a game model. In addition, game approaches have been adopted in dealing with the emerging IoT security issues, e.g., eHealth [24] and trust in wireless sensor networks [25] . The CB-FlipCloud game in this paper is developed based on the FlipIt game in [26] which has been used to capture the stealthy and complete compromise of attackers via advanced persistent threats (APTs). The CB-FlipCloud game differs from the FlipIt game, since the strategies of the cloud defender and attacker in our framework are dependent on the provided contracts from the physical layer. In addition, the outcome of the CB-FlipCloud game provides a quantitative measure of cloud QoS under APTs which influences the physical systems design.
A lot of recent works have been contributed to APTs [5] , [27] [28] [29] including through game-theoretic approaches [16] , [30] . In [16] , the authors have addressed the APT threats in cyber-physical systems by proposing a multi-layer FlipIt game-based model. [30] has designed a dynamic defense strategy which jointly takes the threats from the APT attacker and the insider into account.
Contract design has a rich literature in economics and operation research which has been widely applied to financial markets [31] and supply chains [32] , [33] . Contract-based approach has been adopted in various application domains including power and vehicle networks [34] , IoT [35] , and smart cities [36] . We will extend this approach to interconnect the security services at the cyber layer and the IoT performances at the physical layer. For a comprehensive introduction of contract theory, interested readers can refer to [37] .
Asymmetric information is an important feature of contract design problems. For example, in the risk management of supply chains [32] , [33] , the suppliers have a number of types unknown to the buyer. Thus, the buyer needs to design a menu of contracts in terms of the type of the supplier. Our work captures the asymmetric information relationships between the cloud SP and devices, and designs optimal contracts under the new paradigm of SaaS in cloud-enabled IoCT.
B. Notations and Conventions
To enhance the readability of this paper, we summarize the adopted notations as follows. Matrices A, B and C correspond to the state space model of the physical system. Matrices Q and R related to the costs of state deviation and control effort of the physical system. ρ M captures the quality of security service of M -type cloud, which corresponds to the proportion of time that the defender controls the cloud resources denoted by z M . Note that the types of the contract lie in the set M ∈ {H, L}. Some other key notations are summarized in Table I .
C. Organization of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the bi-level cyber-physical framework and the service flows in the contract design. We formulate the contract design problem in Section III. Analysis of the CB-FlipCloud game in the cloud and the optimal control of physical systems are given in Section IV. Section V designs the optimal contracts for the devices under asymmetric information. Case studies of smart home design are presented in Section VI, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first introduce a bi-level system model that captures the features of the contract design for Fig. 2 . Bi-level framework for the optimal contract design in the cloudenabled IoCT. The cyber layer uses a CB-FlipCloud game to capture the competitions between the defender and attacker with actions f and g, respectively, and then determines the cloud service z to the device based on the offered contract (p, p, q, v) from the physical layer. The physical system at the lower layer uses optimal control computed by the cloud, and its performance is dependent on the cloud QoS z. The interdependent structure makes the decision-makings of two layers correlated.
cloud-enabled IoCT. Then, we present the service flows and timing in the contract design.
A. Bi-Level System Framework
The proposed bi-level system framework is shown in Fig. 2 including the cyber and physical layers. We introduce these two layers and state their couplings.
1) Cyber Layer:
The cyber layer of the framework in Fig. 2 is concerned with cloud security under APTs. We adopt a two-person CB-FlipCloud game-theoretic framework to capture the interactions between the cloud defender and attacker. Specifically, the two players, the defender and the attacker, at the cyber layer compete to control the cloud resources for a larger fraction of time. We denote by f and g the strategies of the defender and the attacker, respectively. When the cyber layer is under the control of the defender, then the cloud services can be reliably delivered to the devices at the physical layer. Otherwise, the cloud services will be degraded. Knowing that securing and attacking the cloud resources are costly for the defender and the attacker, respectively, both players choose their actions in a strategic manner. The outcome of the CB-FlipCloud game determines the cloud QoS provided to the device, denoted by z. We consider without loss of generality two types of QoS, high-type (H -type) and low-type (L-type). The type of QoS is private information of the cloud SPs which is unknown to the devices. Due to the asymmetric information, the devices at physical layer need to design a menu of two contracts. We present the details of CB-FlipCloud game in Section III-B.
2) Physical Layer: At the physical layer shown in Fig. 2 , the systems use optimal control computed by the cloud to operate the system. The role of cloud computing for the physical systems and the dynamic models of physical systems are discussed in Section III-A. Note that the performance of the physical system is closely related to the security of cloud. A better cloud QoS z ensures that the physical system receives control commands more reliably. In order to receive cloud service, the device needs to design a contract with the SP to guarantee the reliability of the cloud. Since the physical system has no knowledge about the security of cloud, he needs to design two types of contracts including H -type and L-type:
, wherep i ∈ R + is the transfer payment from the physical system; p i ∈ R + is the unit payment of service; q i ∈ R + is the targeted cloud quality; and v i ∈ R + is a parameter corresponding to the penalty of degraded service, for i ∈ {H, L}. Note that R + denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. The detailed contract design problem for cloud-enabled IoCT is introduced in Section III-C.
3) Couplings Between Cyber and Physical Layers: The cyber layer and the physical layer in Fig. 2 are interdependent. At the cyber layer, the cloud SP designs a cyber defense strategy f based on the received contract from devices, and the resulting Nash equilibrium of CB-FlipCloud game ( f * , g * ) determines the delivered cloud QoS z. The device at the physical layer designs the contracts by taking into account the received cloud QoS z. Here, we drop the type index H and L for clarity. Due to the reliance of optimal control of devices on the cloud services, the design of contract needs to take into account the requirement of physical system performance. This coupling between cyber physical layers makes the decision-makings of the cloud SP and the device interdependent.
B. Timing of Contract Design
To better clarify the coupled CB-FlipCloud game and the contract design, we present the detailed service flow in the bi-level framework in the following. The contract design can be divided into two main stages including the contracting and execution as shown in Fig. 3 . The timing of the events are summarized as follows. First, the nature reveals the type to the cloud but not to the physical device which introduces an asymmetric information structure. Then, the device designs and offers two contracts in terms of the type of cloud SP. The cloud picks one of the contracts which completes the contracting stage. In the execution stage, based on the accepted contract, the cloud SP makes a defending strategy against the cyber attacker to achieve a certain level of security of the cloud resources. Then, the remote control of the physical system is enabled by the resulting cloud service. If the provided cloud quality does not meet the required one in the contract, then the cloud SP pays a penalty.
In summary, the proposed mechanism starts with devices designing a menu of contracts followed by the cloud SP providing agreed services. A penalty is paid to the devices if the QoS is violated. This constitutes the service flow in the cloud-enabled IoCT.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the physical-layer optimal control of physical systems in Section III-A and then establish a cyber-layer two-player nonzero-sum CB-FlipCloud game for the cloud security in Section III-B. The modular solutions are used to formulate the contract design problem between the physical device and the cloud SP in Section III-C.
A. Optimal Control of the Physical System
The devices in the cloud-enabled IoCT perform various tasks. To measure the performance of IoCT, we need to consider the dynamics of physical systems, e.g., unmanned vehicles, intelligent lighting and autonomous personal robots. Specifically, a device with discrete-time dynamics under the unreliable cloud can be captured by
for k = 0, 1, ..., where x k ∈ R n is the state; u k ∈ R m is the control input; w k ∈ R n is the exogenous disturbance with mean zero; y k ∈ R l is the sensor output; and A, B, C are time-invariant matrices with appropriate dimensions. Note that w k , ∀k, are independent. The stochastic processes {α k } and {β k } model the vulnerability nature of the cloud, and they capture the successful information transmission from the controller to the actuator (downlink) and from the sensor to the controller (uplink), respectively.
Role of Cloud Computing for the Devices in IoCT:
The cloud-enabled IoCT device is empowered with a high capacity of computational resources and data storage. The device maintains a constant communication with the cloud to collect and store sensor data, process information and compute optimal control outputs. Due to its reliance on the cloud, the device needs to be assured of the trustworthiness of the cloud. Note that {α k } and {β k } model the physical impact of the unreliability of the cloud due to the APTs. Specifically, the disruption of data collection and storage services of the cloud will make the sensor measurements unavailable, i.e., β k = 0. In addition, the disruption of computational services will make the control outputs unavailable, i.e., α k = 0.
Note that the communications between the cloud and devices are secure in our model. The degraded performance of the physical system is due to the loss of sensing and control information at the cloud layer caused by APTs. Let α k and β k be two Bernoulli random variables with the same probability mass function. Since the provided cloud services are divided into two types including the H -type and the L-type, then each type of service has
for i ∈ {H, L}. In addition, we have
Remark: The value of ρ i , i ∈ {H, L}, which represents the cloud quality has a direct influence on the physical system performance given by (3). In the cloud-enabled IoCT, the real provided QoS by the cyber layer is determined by the offered contracts of the device.
We consider the optimal control of the physical system in an infinite horizon, and define the control policy as
where N is the decision horizon, and function μ k maps the information I k to some control space, i.e.,
With a given cloud quality parameter ρ i , the device aims to find an optimal control policy that minimizes the quadratic cost function
while considering the system dynamics (1), where i ∈ {H, L}, R 0 and Q 0. Note that R and Q are two matrices that capture the costs of state deviation and control effort, respectively. For notational brevity, we drop the type index H and L when the context is clear.
B. CB-FlipCloud Game for the Cloud Security
The cloud layer in IoCT faces APTs, and the traditional cryptography approaches may fail to secure the integrated system. To mitigate the cyber risks, we use a CB-FlipCloud game to model the interactions between the defender (D) and attacker (A ) in the cloud. Specifically, the strategies of D and A are to choose f ∈ R + and g ∈ R + , the renewal and attacking frequencies with which they claim control of the cloud resources, respectively. Note that f and g are chosen by prior commitment such that neither D nor A knows the opponent's action when making choices. In addition, we focus the CB-FlipCloud game analysis on periodic strategies, in which the moves of D and A are both spaced equally apart, and their phases are chosen randomly from a uniform distribution [26] .
Based on f and g, we can compute the expected proportions of time that D and A control the cloud. The main analysis follows from Section 4.1 in [26] . When g = 0, i.e., no A exists in the game, then D controls the cloud for all time which is a trivial case. When A exists and D moves no slower than A , i.e., f ≥ g > 0, and for a given D s move interval τ , the probability that A moves over his phase selection which lies in τ is g f . In addition, A only moves once in τ since f ≥ g, and the move is uniformly distributed over τ . Therefore, the expected proportions of time that A and D control the cloud in this interval are 
Notice that when g > f ≥ 0, i.e., the attacking frequency of A is larger than the renewal frequency of D, then the proportion of time that the cloud is secure is z < Remark: When the defender controls the cloud, then the information is successfully transmitted through the cloud. In addition, in the CB-FlipCloud game, when the interval between consecutive moves is small which results in high move frequencies of D and A , then z can be interpreted as the probability of random variables α k and β k being 1 in (1).
Therefore, the CB-FlipCloud game outcome z determines the cloud quality measure ρ in (2) . We use z to represent the provided cloud QoS in the following.
Then, the optimization problem for the cloud SP under the 
Based on the accepted contract, the attacker and defender in the CB-FlipCloud game yield a Nash equilibrium strategy pair ( f * , g * ) which has a unique mapping to z * through (4). Hence, the CB-FlipCloud game equilibrium determines the risk of a chosen cloud service for the device subject to APTs. More details of the CB-FlipCloud game analysis including the equilibrium are presented in Section IV-A.
C. Contract Design for the Physical Layer
The type of the cloud is private information. The device designs a menu of two contracts,
, based on the prior probability σ ∈ [0, 1] of the cloud being H -type.
Due to this asymmetric information structure, we find the optimal contracts for the device by formulating it as a mechanism design problem. Specifically, by using the revelation principle [8] , we address the contract design by focusing on the incentive compatible and direct revelation mechanisms. Therefore, the contract design problem (CDP) for the physical device is formulated as follows:
where φ H and φ L are positive weighting parameters; Note that (6a) and (6b) in CDP are incentive compatibility (IC) constraints which ensure that a cloud does not benefit from lying about its type to the physical system. In addition, (6c) and (6d) are called individual rationality (IR) constraints which indicate that a cloud accepts the contract only when its minimum profit is met. By focusing on the IC and IR constraints yielded by the revelation principle [8] , the device at the physical layer designs such contracts that give an optimal tradeoff between the payment to the cloud SP and the received cloud QoS.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CLOUD SECURITY
AND PHYSICAL SYSTEMS In this section, we first analyze the CB-FlipCloud game that captures the cloud layer security, and then present the optimal control results of the physical systems. In addition, we discuss the impact of cloud quality on the performance of devices.
A. Security Analysis of the Cloud Layer
In order to design a strategy for the cloud defender, we first need to analyze the CB-FlipCloud game under each type of contract. The defense cost function C M : R + → R + can be defined as
which comes from the CB-FlipCloud game, where M ∈ {H, L}, and ψ M D > 0 is the unit defending cost of the cloud. The cloud SP provides different types of services in terms of the QoS captured by z. The penalty function
where z M is obtained through (4), and 1 {•} is an indicator function. Recall that v M is a term in the M -type contract.
Some natural assumptions on the parameters are as follows.
Assumption 1: For the penalty and payment parameters, we have
where v H,max and v L ,max are the maximum unit penalty in the H -type and L-type contracts, respectively. Note that the inequalities (9) and (10) differentiate the unit payment and penalty in the H -type and L-type contracts. In addition, (11) and (12) indicate that the unit penalty in both contracts is larger than the unit payment and bounded above.
Based on (4), we need to discuss two cases of the CB-FlipCloud game. Specifically, when f H ≥ g H > 0 which yields z H = 1 − g H 2 f H , the CB-FlipCloud game for the cloud under the H -type contract can be formulated as
where 
, the CB-FlipCloud game under the L-type contract can be formulated similarly.
Another non-trivial case of the CB-FlipCloud game is when g M > f M > 0, for M ∈ {H, L}. In this scenario, the proportions of time that the cloud defender and attacker controlling the cloud resources are equal to
, respectively. Then, the CB-FlipCloud game can be formulated as
The interpretations of each term in F M D and F M A are the same as the corresponding one in (13) . Denote the nonzero-sum CB-FlipCloud security game under M -type cloud by G M , M ∈ {H, L}, for convenience. Then, the solution concept of G M is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium of G M ): A Nash equilibrium of the CB-FlipCloud game G M is a strategy profile
Based on the Nash equilibrium of the CB-FlipCloud game G M , we obtain
Next, we analyze the cloud defender's strategy for a given contract (p, p, q, v) . We first have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given a contract (p, p, q, v) , the Nash equilibrium strategy of the CB-FlipCloud game leads to q +
Proof: In the regime of f * ≥ g * > 0, assume that q +
is not a CB-FlipCloud game equilibrium. Hence, q + g * 2 f * − 1 < 0 does not hold. Similar analysis applies to the regime of g * > f * > 0, and we can obtain q − f * 2g * ≥ 0. Proposition 1 indicates that the cloud will not provide better QoS than the one required in the contract to achieve more profits. Based on Proposition 1, we can simplify the CB-FlipCloud game G M and obtain its Nash equilibrium solution as follows.
Theorem 1: The Nash equilibria of the CB-FlipCloud game are summarized as follows:
In addition, the attacker is solving min g ψ A g − u A g 2 f . Then, the above CB-FlipCloud game is strategically equivalent to the game that the defender solves max f (1 − g , which reduces the cloud security game to the form in [26] and can be solved accordingly. The analysis is similar for the case when g > f > 0.
For clarity, a pictorial illustration of the obtained Nash equilibria of CB-FlipCloud game is shown in Fig. 4 . Under the Nash equilibrium, the utility of the cloud SP can be expressed as
Remark: From Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, we obtain that when
, the required cloud quality q in the 
; and when
In addition, two different regimes in Fig. 4 have various physical interpretations. Specifically, the contracts that result in a Nash equilibrium of CB-FlipCloud game in regime I correspond to the devices receiving a higher cloud QoS and hence a better physical system performance. Further, the cloud QoS in regime I means that more than half of the total packets are successfully transmitted over the cloud, since the proportion of time that the cloud is secure is z * > 1 2 . In contrast, the security service in regime II with z * < 1 2 corresponds to the scenario that more than half of packets are lost during the transmission resulting in a worse cloud QoS than that in regime I.
The difference between the H -type and L-type cloud's profit under a certain contract is critical in designing the optimal contracts in Section V, and we define it as follows.
Definition 2: For a given contract (p, p, q, v), the benefit of being an H -type cloud over an L-type cloud is defined as
Note that δ is not a function of contract terms, sincē p, p, q, v are not coupled with other parameters of the cloud attacker and defender as seen from equations (17) and (18) . To facilitate the optimal contract design, without loss of generality, we make the following assumption on the parameters at cyber layer.
Assumption 2: Several cyber layer parameters satisfy
In Assumption 2, the inequality
indicates that the H -type cloud is more resistant to malicious attacks, and the equality u H A = u L A represents that the unit payoff of compromising two types of cloud are the same. Note that Assumption 2 is not strict, and we use it to determine the sign of δ. Based on (17), (18) and Assumption 2, we obtain δ ≥ 0. Thus, the profit of the H -type cloud is no less than the L-type cloud for a given contract (p, p, q, v) .
Remark: The parameter δ is not necessary non-negative, and Assumption 2 is not strict. To be practical, we choose δ to be non-negative. The results obtained in this section can be easily extended to the case with negative values of δ.
B. Physical System Analysis
The cloud defense strategy at the cyber layer and the contract design of device are interdependent. At the physical layer, one critical problem is the stability of the device. First, we present the following lemma.
Lemma 1 [38 
where ζ and λ(A) denote the spectral radius and the eigenvalue of system matrix A, respectively. We choose the utility function of the physical system as
where J ( * |z) is the optimal control cost under z. Remark: The physical system is unstable when (19) is not satisfied, and U (z) → −∞ under which the contract design problem is infeasible. Hence, the contract should be designed in a way such that if it is picked by the cloud SP, the provided cloud QoS can stabilize the physical system.
Obtaining the optimal cost J ( * |z) for the device is critical. We state the solution to the optimal controller design over insecure cloud as follows.
Theorem 2 [38, Th. 3]: For the physical system with insecure cloud in IoCT, the optimal control law is
where the matrix G k = −(R + B T K k+1 B) −1 B T K k+1 A, with K k recursively given by the Riccati equation
The estimatorx k takes the form
In addition, when k → ∞, lim k→∞ G k = G, and the controller takes the form of u k = Gx k and
(22) Note that the parameter K in (22) corresponds to the cloud quality z, and the controller is computed using services in the cloud. Under condition (19) , the system is stable in mean square sense at the steady state as k → ∞. Therefore, the average physical system cost in an infinite horizon as shown in (3) will converge asymptotically to the expected system cost at the steady state (see [39, Ch. 7] ). Based on (3) and (21), we obtain
The relationship between z and J ( * |z) is critical for the contract design. Specifically, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Under the condition ζ <
, the cost J( * |z) of the physical system is monotonically decreasing with the increase of cloud quality z.
Remark: Lemma 2 can be interpreted as follows. With smaller z, i.e., the probability of loss of information over the cloud is large, then the physical system states and the control inputs will encounter large deviations from the nominal ones frequently. Therefore, the control cost J ( * |z) increases. The following example is used to corroborate the monotonicity of J ( * |z) with respect to z.
Example: The physical system matrices are given by
Then the spectral radius of matrix A is equal to ζ = 2.08. From Lemma 1, the worst-case cloud quality is z = 0.77 to stabilize the system. In addition, the exogenous disturbance is with zero mean and unit variance. By designing the optimal controller as in Theorem 2, Fig. 5 shows the system performance under various cloud qualities with an initial system state x 0 = [10, −10] T . The results show that a better cloud quality leads to a lower system cost which corroborates Lemma 2.
In the previous works [38] , [40] , the cyber security measurement z is fixed, and the physical systems design the optimal control strategy based on z. In our work, the physical layer plays an active role in the cloud-enabled IoCT and transfers the risks to the cyber layer by adopting a contract design approach to enable an on-demand service provision of security.
V. OPTIMAL CONTRACTS DESIGN UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
We have analyzed the CB-FlipCloud game at the cyber layer and the optimal control of the physical system over insecure cloud in Section IV. In this section, we design the optimal H -type and L-type contracts for the device under the asymmetric information in both regimes shown in Fig. 4 .
A. Optimal Contracts Design over Regime I
In regime I, the devices require a cloud QoS that more than half of the total packets are successfully transmitted over the cloud to stabilize the system. To design optimal contracts over regime I, we first simplify the constrained contract design problem formulated in Section III-C as follows.
Proposition 2: The CDP in Section III-C is equivalent to Proof: Based on (16), the objective function in CDP can be rewritten as
Furthermore, based on Definition 2, we have
Then, plugging (25) into the IC constraints (6a) and (6b) yields
The constraints (6a)-(6d) can be equivalently captured by (26) together
On the other hand, notice that for given p M and v M , the objective function (24) 
achieves the minimum. The underlying interpretation is that a lower utility of the cloud leads to a higher cloud QoS which is beneficial for the physical system. Therefore, based on (26) 
which result in CDP .
Remark: Note that in CDP , IC and IR constraints are incorporated into the objective function. In addition, two separate minimization terms in CDP are decoupled in the decision variables, and thus can be solved independently.
First, we focus on
In addition, three underlying constraints are
Then, we obtain Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: The H -type contract design in regime I is only dependent on the system performance at physical layer, and a larger value of v H + p H leads to a better contract.
Proof: Notice that arg min
is irrelevant to the contract parameters. Thus, the contract design only relates to the physical system performance. In addition, Lemma 2 indicates that U (z * H ) is monotonically increasing with respect to z * H . Since
, larger v H + p H yields a better contract.
Next, through analyzing the impact of contract on the physical systems, we obtain the optimal H -type contract in regime I as follows.
Theorem 3: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal H -type contract
Proof: From (27), we obtain π 
Therefore, together with the bound, the penalty parameter v H
− p H }, and then the 
Theorem 4: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal L-type contract
Similarly, when the optimal contract in Theorem 4 satisfies
, then the device will not place the contract due to the instability of the physical system. Remark: We summarize the features of the optimal H -type and L-type contracts design in regime I as follows. First, the complex contract design is simplified to a physical system cost minimization problem. Second, no contract will be offered to the cloud SP if the resulting QoS cannot stabilize the physical system. One possible reason is that the unit defending cost of cloud SP is relatively large, and thus the cloud defender prefers not to spend enough effort on protecting the cloud resources. Third, the transfer payment is equal to zero, and the requested cloud quality achieves the upper bound. Fourth, the payoffs of the H -type and L-type clouds are δ + L and L , respectively, which are constants in this scenario.
B. Optimal Contracts Design over Regime II
In regime II, the physical system can be stabilized even under the condition that half of packets are lost during the transmission, and this characteristic indicates that the physical system is quite robust inherently. Via a similar analysis as in regime I, the H -type and L-type optimal contracts over regime II can be designed independently. We first investigate the H -type contract design through solving
where
4:
go to step 11 7: else 8: project x (n+1) to the nearest feasible bound as x * 9:
go to step 13 10: end if 11: n = n + 1 12: end while 13 : return x * On one hand, 
Recall that ζ is a constant smaller than 1 2 . In addition, note that for the above optimization problem, the same value of v H + p H leads to the same objective only if the constraints are satisfied. Thus, the optimal contract in regime II is not unique. We first focus on obtaining the optimal v H + p H .
Note that the constraints related to v H + p H can be captured
In addition, the performance function U (z * H ) is approximated by an analytical function according to the specific characteristics of the device. Then, T (x) is continuously differentiable, and the gradient descent method can be used to find the optimal x * that minimizes
Denote the feasible interval by x ∈ [x,x] for convenience, and the iterative method to find the optimal x * is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Based on Algorithm 1, the designed optimal H -type contract in regime II is summarized in the following theorem. 
In addition, based on π
we obtain the transfer payment asp
To design the L-type contract in regime II, the function T (x) in Algorithm 1 admits the form
. Through similar analysis as that in Theorem 5, we obtain the optimal L-type contract over regime II as follows.
Theorem 6: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an optimal L-type contract
where x * is obtained through Algorithm 1. Remark: The designed optimal contracts in Theorems 5 and 6 incorporate the nature that the device only requires the level of cloud QoS that can stabilize the system. It is reasonable since the devices that propose contracts in regime II are less critical as those making contracts over regime I who always request the best possible cloud QoS. Different from the contracts in regime I, the transfer payment in the contracts over regime II is not zero, because the physical system aims to propose less unit payment while with a larger penalty in the contract. In addition, this type of contract, i.e., with a high transfer payment, also aligns with the fact that the cloud SP with worse QoS tends to receive payment ahead of time before delivering services.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we illustrate the designed optimal contracts via case studies. Specifically, we investigate the cloud security as a service for heterogeneous IoCTs with an application to smart home design.
A. Smart Home Framework
A smart home (SH) is an intelligent system that incorporates advanced automation technologies to provide inhabitants with sophisticated monitoring and control over the building function [41] . A general smart home illustration is shown in Fig. 6 which includes various physical systems and the cloud. Therefore, the SH can be seen as a small-scale cloudenabled IoCT. Without loss of generality, we mainly focus on three devices: a smart lighting system, a heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system and a pacemaker (Fig. 6) . The smart lighting system is designed to be energy-saving while guaranteeing the necessary brightness of the room [42] . The HVAC system in the smart home controls the room temperature by optimally adjusting the air mass flow through the ducts into the room [43] . The pacemaker device is to maintain a normal heart rhythm of the patient through a controlled electrical pulse to the heart [44] . The various importance of each system and their different unit control cost can be captured by the matrices Q and R in the performance objective (3).
B. Regime I Study (Optimal Contracts for Pacemaker)
We design the optimal contracts for the pacemaker device in this section. The system states include the heart rhythm and its adjustment speed [44] , [45] . The objective is to maintain the patient's heart rhythm at a nominal value with small bounded state deviations. Due to the significant importance of the device, the required cloud quality should be high. Through the eigenvalue analysis of the adopted system model, the minimum cloud QoS is z = 0.889, above which the state deviations are within an acceptable interval. Since z > 0.5, the contract design for pacemaker naturally falls into the regime I in Fig. 4 .
Several other parameters in the contract design are summarized as follows:
and q H,max = 0.96. Note that the cloud defense and attack costs include the expenditures on facilities and labors, etc. The minimum profit for delivering the service varies with cloud service providers, e.g., Google and Microsoft [46] . In addition, the H -type and L-type contracts refer to different levels of provided cloud security services.
First, we illustrate the case of H -type contract design. Specifically, the unit defending cost of the L-type cloud is chosen as ψ L D = $8K, and we design the H -type contract in the reasonable regime of ψ H D that satisfies the conditions in Assumption 2. The corresponding results are shown in Fig. 7 . In the contractable regime of Fig. 7(a) , with the increasing of ψ H D , the unit payment p H decreases first and then keeps as a constant. In contrast, in Fig. 7(b) , the unit penalty v H increases first and then becomes unchanged. The unchanging regime of ψ H D is due to the fact that v H achieves the maximum. The utility of the H -type cloud is decreasing as the defending cost becomes larger as depicted in Fig. 7(c) , and this property can be verified by equation (27) . Note that when ψ H D /ψ H A ≥ 1.01, no H -type contract is accepted by the cloud since the cloud's minimum utility H cannot be met by providing the service. The required and real provided cloud quality are presented in Fig. 7(d) . As shown in Proposition 1, the provided cloud QoS z H will never be greater than the required one q H . In addition, in the middle regime, z H decreases as the defending cost increases. The reason is that the penalty v H and the payment p H are constants, and then the cloud SP can earn more profit by spending less effort on protecting the cloud resources which results in worse QoS. In the L-type contract, we fix the unit defending cost of the H -type cloud as ψ H D = $6K, and study the optimal contract design with varying parameter ψ L D . Fig. 8 presents the results of the L-type contract. From Fig. 8(a) , the unit payment p L is increasing with larger unit defending cost ψ L D which is different with that in the H -type contract. The unit penalty v L in Fig. 7(a) has the same trend as that in Fig. 8(a) . The utility of the L-type cloud is a constant in the contractable regime as shown in Fig. 8 (c) which verifies equation (28) . The provided cloud quality z L first keeps the same as the requested one q L in the contract, and then decreases as the defending cost ψ L D becomes larger, and finally jumps to zero since no contract is agreed. The reason for the uncontractable regime in this case differs from that in H -type contract design (the minimum profit is not met for the H -type cloud). When ψ L D /ψ L A > 1.32, the provided service z L is smaller than the minimum required one q L ,min = 0.89 which yields the uncontractable situation.
C. Regime II Study (Optimal Contracts for HVAC System)
The HVAC system in SH adjusts the interior room temperature by controlling the air mass flow through the ducts into the house. Two critical states of the HVAC system are the room temperature and its changing rate [43] . The HVAC physical system is inherently robust, and it can be stabilized when the cloud quality satisfies z > 0.28. When z < 0.28, the control cost is extremely high and thus makes the control effort infeasible. Some parameters in the following case studies are as follows: q H,min = 0.32, q H,max = 0.5 and φ H = 0.13. Other parameters related to the cloud layer are the same as those in Section VI-B.
The contract design for HVAC system lies in regime II, since the provided cloud QoS will not exceed the required one which is upper bounded by q H,max = 0.5. To design the optimal contracts over regime II, knowing the relationship Fig. 9 .
Performance of HVAC system. When z < 0.28, the system is unstable. In acceptable cloud quality regime, the system performance can be approximated by an exponential function. between the cloud QoS and the physical system performance is critical. The control cost of HVAC system with respect to cloud quality is depicted in Fig. 9 . To enable the algorithmic design of contracts, the control cost of HVAC system can be approximated by an exponential function, and hence yields a continuously twice differentiable function T (x) in algorithm 1. Together with the results in Theorem 5, we can design the optimal H -type contract for HVAC system.
The results corresponding to different cloud defending costs ψ H D are shown in Fig. 10 . The obtained optimal contracts in the contractable regime is nonlinear with respect to ψ H D . In addition, the cloud SP can provide the exactly required service as in the contract when ψ H D is small, and hence does not suffer penalty despite the unit penalty term v H is increasing. However, the profit of the cloud SP is decreasing due to the increase of defending cost and the decrease of transfer payment. When the provided cloud QoS is worse than the required one, the device can still make a contract with the cloud SP until the received service incurs a huge control cost. The optimal L-type contract for HVAC system can be designed similarly according to the results in Theorem 6.
D. Joint Contracts Design for Heterogeneous Devices
In this section, we present the integrated contacts design for all devices shown in Fig. 6 . The characteristics of the pacemaker device and HVAC system have been introduced in Sections VI-B and VI-C, respectively. For the smart lighting system, better cloud QoS ensures the continuously smooth adjustment of the brightness in SH. Through the spectrum analysis on the modeled system matrices, the lighting system operates normally under the optimal control when cloud quality z > 0.44. Next, we design the optimal contracts under given unit defending cost of cloud for all devices. Specifically, we set ψ H D = $8K and ψ L D = $3.2K for the H -type and L-type cloud, respectively. Other parameters are the same as those in Sections VI-B and VI-C.
Based on the analytical results in Section V, Fig. 11 presents the designed contracts for all three devices. Naturally, the terms in H -type contracts are all no less than their counterparts in L-type contracts. The contracts of pacemaker device have the highest unit payment and penalty due to its demanding request of cloud quality. Both H -type and L-type contracts of HVAC system are in regime II, since the provided cloud QoS is less than 0.5 but is still able to stabilize the system. The H -type contract of smart lighting system belongs to regime I while its L-type contract lies in regime II. Though the transfer payment is 0 in its H -type contract comparing with $16.12K in the L-type one, the lighting system needs to pay more to the H -type cloud SP due to the corresponding larger unit payment. The established SH framework is flexible, and the user can design globally optimal contracts by taking the preferences of different devices into account.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied the optimal contract design for the cloudenabled Internet of Controlled Things (IoCT) through the paradigm of security as a service. In terms of the cloud security quality of service (QoS), the contract design has been divided into two regimes (regimes I and II). The inherently robust devices can design optimal contracts in regime I of which the required cloud QoS stabilizes the physical system; while those devices whose optimal contacts lie in regime II always ask for the best cloud QoS. In addition, payoffs of the considered two types of cloud service providers (SPs) are constants based on the accepted incentive compatible and individual rational contract from the device. The cloud-enabled smart home design has shown that for critical devices, the user should require a high-level cloud security and assign a large penalty if receiving a degraded service in the contract. For the devices with lower priority, the user makes a transfer payment to the cloud SP ahead of time for the security service to optimize his utility. The future work would include the extension of the current framework by considering the continuous type of cloud service provider and quantifying the value of asymmetric information. Another future direction would take the communication security between the cyber and physical layers into account, and design contracts for trustworthy communication services.
